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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issues raised here on appeal require us to address 
the remedial provisions of the Cable Communications Policy 
Act of 1984 which prohibits unauthorized interception or 
reception of cable communication services. See 47 U.S.C.A. 
S 553 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999). 
 
Following a jury trial, Nu-Tek Electronics & 
Manufacturing, Inc. was ordered to pay $60,000 in 
damages and $412,178.92 in attorney's fees and costs to 
General Instrument Corporation for violating the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 
Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 
U.S.C.A.), specifically 47 U.S.C.A. S 553 which prohibits 
assisting in unauthorized cable service reception. The 
District Court also entered a permanent injunction barring 
Nu-Tek from continuing its unlawful activities. The key 
issues raised in this case are whether General Instrument 
Corporation had standing to bring a suit under the Cable 
Act (Nu-Tek's appeal) and whether statutory civil damages 
under the Act are limited to $60,000 regardless of the 
number of violations (General Instrument's cross-appeal). 
The scope of the injunction and the calculation of the 
amount of attorney's fees are also at issue. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court on all 
issues. 
 




General Instrument Corporation manufactures cable 
descrambler boxes and sells them to programmers such as 
Comcast and Cablevision, who in turn rent them to their 
customers for a monthly fee. Nu-Tek Electronics & 
Manufacturing, Inc. engaged in the business of obtaining 
boxes manufactured by General Instrument and converting 
them to receive all signals sent by the cable programmer, 
whether or not the box owner had paid for the 
programming. Nu-Tek's converted boxes allowed cable 
subscribers to receive premium channels, even if they paid 
only for basic cable service. In industry terminology, the 
converted boxes were "nonaddressable" and "bulletproof," 
meaning that the cable programmer was not aware of their 
use and could not disable the descramblers nor control 
which channels were accessible. Between 1992 and 1995, 
Nu-Tek sold over 5,000 such devices. 
 
General Instrument sued Nu-Tek in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of (1) the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C.A. SS 553 and 
605; (2) the Lanham Act; and (3) federal copyright law. Prior 
to trial, the parties voluntarily stipulated to a dismissal of 
the copyright claim. The District Court also dismissed 
General Instrument's claim brought under 47 U.S.C.A. 
S 605, leaving only the S 553 and Lanham Act claims. A 
jury rendered a verdict for General Instrument on the S 553 
claim, and for Nu-Tek on the Lanham Act claim. 
 
The District Court entered judgment in favor of General 
Instrument for $60,000 in damages, which it found to be 
the maximum amount allowed under the Cable Act, plus 
reasonable attorney's fees. See General Instrument Corp. v. 
Nu-Tek Elec. & Mfg., Inc., No. 93-3854, 1997 WL 325804 
(E.D. Pa. June 4, 1997) (General Instrument II). A week 
later, the court issued an order permanently enjoining Nu- 
Tek from manufacturing or distributing General Instrument 
descrambler boxes modified to descramble cable signals 
without authorization, and forbidding Nu-Tek from 
transforming itself into a new entity to continue its cable 
theft business or contributing to other cable theft 
businesses. See Order of 6/11/97. 
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Subsequently, the District Court resolved several post- 
trial motions, some of which form the basis for this appeal 
-- namely, denying Nu-Tek's motion to amend the 
injunction and granting General Instrument's motion for 
attorney's fees on the Cable Act claim, fixing fees at 
$412,178.92. See General Instrument Corp. v. Nu-Tek Elec. 
& Mfg., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (General 
Instrument III). The remaining issues raised by Nu-Tek on 
this appeal -- namely, whether General Instrument had 
constitutional, prudential, and statutory standing to sue 
Nu-Tek -- were decided in a 1996 pretrial order denying 
Nu-Tek's motion for judgment on the pleadings. See 
General Instrument Corp. v. Nu-Tek Elec. & Mfg., Inc., No. 
93-3854, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11175 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 30, 
1996) (General Instrument I). In its cross-appeal, General 
Instrument contends the District Court erred in holding the 
Cable Act provided for an award of no more than $60,000 
in statutory civil damages for "all" of Nu-Tek's S 533 
violations. See General Instrument II, 1997 WL 325804, at 
*4. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 







Nu-Tek contends that General Instrument lacked 
constitutional, statutory, and prudential standing. We 
exercise plenary review of standing and statutory 
construction issues, but review for clear error the factual 
elements underlying the District Court's determination of 
standing. See Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 
50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Contents of Accounts Nos. 3034504504 and 144-07143 at 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 971 F.2d 974, 
984 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
1. Constitutional Standing 
 
Constitutional standing is grounded in Article III's 
provision limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts to 
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"cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III S 2. The 
Supreme Court has established a three-part test for 
determining constitutional standing: 
 
       First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact 
       -- an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 
       (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or 
       imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, 
       there must be a causal connection between the injury 
       and the conduct complained of -- the injury has to be 
       fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
       defendant, and not the result of the independent action 
       of some third party not before the court. Third, it must 
       be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the 
       injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 
 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); 
accord Conte, 165 F.3d at 225 (constitutional standing has 
three elements: an injury in fact, traceable to defendant, 
and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision). 
 
Contending General Instrument failed to prove "injury in 
fact," Nu-Tek asserts "[t]he testimony at trial in this case 
unequivocally showed that General Instrument never lost a 
single sale of its products" because, as evidenced by 
General Instrument's backlog, it could not satisfy existing 
customer demand. 
 
We disagree. In determining whether a plaintiff satisfies 
the requirements of constitutional standing, the extent of 
the injury plaintiff suffered is generally immaterial to the 
question of injury in fact; "an `identifiable trifle' will suffice." 
Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn 
Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)). There is 
considerably more here. General Instrument's Director of 
Security, Stan Durey, testified at trial that General 
Instrument incurs significant ongoing costs in policing 
cable theft of its devices, and that General Instrument's 
customers (cable operators) hold General Instrument 
accountable for cable theft devices found on their systems. 
Durey recounted a specific instance in which General 
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Instrument lost an account with Scripps Howard Cable 
because of the rate of piracy in General Instrument cable 
boxes and the cost of remedying the problem. Durey's 
testimony was supported by testimony of executives from 
Comcast and Suburban Cable, who stated that security 
problems in General Instrument's systems would make 
them less likely to do business with General Instrument. 
These concrete, direct harms to General Instrument were 
more than sufficient to meet the injury-in-fact requirement. 
Furthermore, there is no doubt Nu-Tek was at least in part 
the cause of these harms, and a decision favorable to 
General Instrument would provide some redress. 
Consequently, we will uphold the District Court's 
determination that General Instrument satisfied 
constitutional standing requirements. 
 
2. Prudential Standing 
 
Nu-Tek argues that even if General Instrument has 
satisfied constitutional standing requirements, prudential 
limitations on standing preclude General Instrument from 
bringing a claim under S 553. Prudential standing consists 
of "a set of judge-made rules forming an integral part of 
`judicial self-government.' " Conte, 165 F.3d at 225 (quoting 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). These requirements are designed 
to "limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best 
suited to assert a particular claim." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985). 
 
Where Congress has expressly conferred standing by 
statute, prudential standing concerns are superseded. See 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ("Congress may 
grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise 
would be barred by prudential standing rules."); accord 
Conte, 165 F.3d at 227 (noting that "Congress can 
eliminate prudential restrictions on standing if it so desires" 
but "as a matter of statutory interpretation . . . Congress is 
presumed to incorporate background prudential standing 
principles, unless the statute expressly negates them"). 
Here, the District Court held that prudential standing 
concerns were superseded by S 553, which confers standing 
on "any person aggrieved" by a violation of the Act's anti- 
theft provision. See General Instrument I, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11175, at *7. 
 
                                6 
  
Section 553(a) makes it unlawful to intercept or receive 
cable services without the operator's consent: 
 
       (1) No person shall intercept or receive or assist in 
       intercepting or receiving any communications service 
       offered over a cable system, unless specifically 
       authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may 
       otherwise be specifically authorized by law. 
 
       (2) For the purpose of this section, the term "assist in 
       intercepting or receiving" shall include the 
       manufacture or distribution of equipment intended by 
       the manufacturer or distributor (as the case may be) 
       for unauthorized reception of any communications 
       service offered over a cable system in violation of 
       subparagraph (1). 
 
47 U.S.C.A. S 553(a). Subsection (c) of S 553 creates a 
private cause of action under which General Instrument 
sued: 
 
       (1) Any person aggrieved by any violation of subsection 
       (a)(1) of this section may bring a civil action in a United 
       States district court or in any other court of competent 
       jurisdiction. 
 
Id. S 553(c)(1). A party who fulfilled the injury-in-fact prong 
of the constitutional standing requirements would also be a 
"person aggrieved" and would therefore fulfill the plain 
language of the statute. Furthermore, the phrase "any 
person aggrieved" is "ordinarily sufficient to confer standing 
on any party satisfying the constitutional requirements." 
Sioux Falls Cable Television v. South Dakota, 838 F.2d 249, 
252 (8th Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently 
stated that Congress' use of "any person aggrieved" in the 
Census Act, 13 U.S.C.A. S 209(b) (West 1990),"eliminated 
any prudential concerns in [that] case." Department of 
Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S. 
Ct. 765, 772 (1999). 
 
But Nu-Tek points out that 47 U.S.C.A. S 605 (West 1991 
& Supp. 1999) (directed at wire and radio communication 
theft and publication) also uses the term "any person 
aggrieved" and defines it as follows: 
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       [T]he term "any person aggrieved" shall include any 
       person with proprietary rights in the intercepted 
       communication by wire or radio, including wholesale or 
       retail distributors of satellite cable programming, and 
       [in certain cases] shall also include any person engaged 
       in the lawful manufacture, distribution, or sale of 
       equipment necessary to authorize or receive satellite 
       cable programming. 
 
47 U.S.C.A. S 605(d)(6) (West Supp. 1999). According to Nu- 
Tek, the addition of a clause in S 605 expressly including 
manufacturers of satellite equipment within the category of 
"any person aggrieved," and thus within the group granted 
a private cause of action, suggests that, by omitting such a 
clause in S 553, Congress did not intend to give 
manufacturers a right to sue under S 553. 
 
This argument is unconvincing. Section 605 establishes 
two separate violations. Section 605(a) generally prohibits 
the unauthorized interception and publication of 
communications. Section 605(e)(4) prohibits manufacturing 
a device or piece of equipment which "is primarily of 
assistance in the unauthorized decryption of satellite cable 
programming . . . or is intended for any other activity 
prohibited by subsection(a)." These violations carry distinct 
penalty and statutory damage provisions, see 47 U.S.C.A. 
S 605(e)(1), (2), (3)(C)(i)(II), (4), and each is referenced in the 
creation of the private cause of action.1  Section 553(c), on 
the other hand, creates a single private cause of action 
against violators of S 553(a)(1) which forbids intercepting, 
receiving, and assisting in intercepting or receiving "any 
communications service offered over a cable system." The 
criminal penalties described in S 553(b) are also stated in 
terms of violations of (a)(1) only. Section 553(a)(2) provides 
"the term `assist in intercepting or receiving' shall include 
the manufacture or distribution of equipment." In short, 
actions treated independently under S 605 are treated in a 
unified manner under S 553. Section 553's failure to 
separately enumerate the types of parties intended to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 605(e)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1999) provides: "Any person aggrieved 
by any violation of subsection (a) of this section or paragraph (4) of 
this 
subsection may bring a civil action." 
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included under "persons aggrieved" is consistent with its 
uniform treatment of possible violations, whileS 605's 
particularity is consistent with the distinctions drawn 
throughout the section. 
 
Furthermore, the structure of S 553 demonstrates that 
"the manufacture [and] distribution of equipment" is 
intended to be included in the types of harms which create 
a cause of action. In creating a private cause of action, 
S 553(c) ("any person aggrieved") specifically references 
S 553(a)(1) ("[n]o person shall . . . assist in intercepting") 
which is in turn referenced by S 553(a)(2) ("the term `assist 
in intercepting or receiving' shall include the manufacture 
or distribution of equipment"). As was made clear during 
the trial, cable box manufacturers like General Instrument 
are directly harmed by the manufacture or distribution of 
equipment which intercepts cable signals and, therefore, 
fall squarely within the language of the statute. 
 
Whether using a fine brush or broad one, however, the 
legislative history of S 553 indicates that Congress intended 
it to provide extensive protection against cable service theft. 
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 84 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4720.2 Such protection requires 
an inclusive interpretation of "any person aggrieved." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The report states, in part: 
 
       The committee is extremely concerned with a problem which is 
       increasingly plaguing the cable industry--the theft of cable 
service. 
       This problem has taken on many forms from the manufacture and 
       sale of equipment intended to permit reception of cable services 
       without paying for it, to apartment building dwellers "tapping" 
into 
       cable system wire in a building's hallway that is used for 
providing 
       service to a neighbor's apartment unit, to the sale by building 
       superintendents of cable converters left behind by previous tenants 
       to new tenants. Such practices not only often permit one to obtain 
       cable service without paying the installation and hook-up costs, 
but 
       also, for instance, involve individuals gaining access to premium 
       movie and sports channels without paying for the receipt of those 
       services. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 84 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 
4720. 
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Accordingly, whether read as an explicit negation of 
prudential standing requirements, see Department of 
Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 772, or in the context of its 
legislative structure and history, see Conte, 165 F.3d at 
227, we believe Congress' use of the phrase "any person 
aggrieved" in S 553(c)(1) confers standing as broadly as the 
Constitution allows. Because we have already determined 
that General Instrument met the constitutional standing 
requirements, we conclude that General Instrument had 
standing to bring this action. 
 
B. Amendment of the Injunction 
 
Nu-Tek appeals the District Court's denial of its motion 
to amend the permanent injunction. We review the terms of 
the injunction for abuse of discretion. See McLendon v. 
Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990). 
But we review for clear error "factual determinations 
prerequisite to issuing the injunction." Id.  at 1177. 
 
According to Nu-Tek, the permanent injunction is vague 
and overbroad, and accordingly would prohibit it from 
engaging in legitimate business activities. Nu-Tek claims 
the injunction violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (requiring that an 
injunction "set forth the reasons for its issuance; . . . be 
specific in its terms [and] . . . describe in reasonable detail 
. . . the act or acts sought to be restrained") and Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 52(a) (requiring the District Court to "set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of the action" when issuing a permanent 
injunction). 
 
In particular, Nu-Tek cites Paragraph 2 of the injunction 
as problematic. Paragraph 2.a prohibits Nu-Tek from 
distributing "any product" that is "designed, intended, or 
capable of being used, either alone or in conjunction with 
any other item, to receive . . . scrambled cable television 
programming without the knowledge or authorization of 
cable operators in whose systems [General Instrument] 
equipment is used." Nu-Tek argues the phrase"capable of 
being used" coupled with "either alone or in conjunction 
with any other item" would prohibit the sale of virtually all 
equipment, including legitimate, unmodified cable 
equipment. Paragraph 2.b prohibits Nu-Tek from 
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"[r]emoving, secreting, concealing, or destroying any 
records, property, or equipment relating to Nu-Tek's 
business operations," and Paragraph 2.c enjoins Nu-Tek 
from "[t]ransferring, removing, encumbering, or permitting 
the withdrawal of any assets or property presently 
belonging to Nu-Tek" without giving General Instrument 
five days' notice.3 According to Nu-Tek, the District Court 
failed to provide record support for these orders, in 
violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. 
 
Contending the restrictions "all have no limitation in 
their duration, and are set forth on a permanent, and 
seemingly perpetual basis," Nu-Tek requests the injunction 
be vacated and remanded to the District Court for proper 
findings. Furthermore, Nu-Tek argues, paragraph 2.c 
imposes an unjustifiable asset freeze that "gives [General 
Instrument] power to prevent Nu-Tek from pursuing any 
lawful business activities, and goes far beyond anything 
necessary to ensure satisfaction of any judgment." 
 
A district court has authority to enjoin parties to a civil 
action subject to limited exceptions, none of which applies 
here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), (e). Furthermore, 47 
U.S.C.A. S 553(c)(2)(A) specifically states that a district 
court may "grant temporary and final injunctions . . . to 
prevent or restrain violations of subsection (a)(1) of [S 553]." 
As an equitable remedy, "the question whether injunctive 
relief is to be granted or withheld is addressed to the 
judge's discretion." Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil 2d S 2941; see also 23 James Wm. 
Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice P 65.01 (2d Ed. 1985). 
"An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal 
district courts is an appeal to the sound discretion which 
guides the determinations of courts of equity." Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (quoting Meredith v. 
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943)). As noted, 
injunctive relief ordered by the District Court is reviewed 
with deference. Applying that standard, we do not believe 
the restrictions imposed here constitute an abuse of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. If General Instrument then withholds approval, Nu-Tek must seek 
permission from the court for the proposed action. See Permanent 
Injunction P2.c. 
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discretion. "The degree of particularity required[in an 
injunction] depends on the nature of the subject matter. 
McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191-92 
(1949) (decrees of generality are often necessary to prevent 
further violations where a proclivity for unlawful conduct 
has been shown)." Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. 
Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1982). The District Court 
explained: 
 
       The underlying fact is that Nu-Tek's business 
       essentially facilitated cable theft in violation ofS 553. 
       To stop such an operation is a primary purpose of the 
       injunction. It forecloses none of Nu-Tek's remaining 
       legitimate business because, from the start, no 
       identifiable legitimate business existed. Likewise, I find 
       that Nu-Tek should not be allowed to use its remaining 
       assets, which in all likelihood can serve only to further 
       other cable theft enterprises. 
 
General Instrument III, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 607-08. Nu-Tek has 
not asserted that the District Court's findings were clearly 
erroneous. And it is readily apparent why, in light of such 
findings, the court would use broad language in the 
injunction. Assets that could be used by a second entity to 
facilitate "further cable theft" must be carefully monitored. 
While the District Court indicated that Nu-Tek may sell 
unmodified General Instrument descramblers without 
violating the injunction, the court ensured through its 
limiting language that this could not become a loophole 
through which Nu-Tek might continue to assist in the theft 
of proprietary programming. We see no abuse of discretion 
here and will uphold the District Court's denial of the 
motion to amend the injunction. 
 
C. Attorney's Fees 
 
Contending that $412,178.92 in attorney's fees is 
unreasonable, Nu-Tek requests that we vacate the District 
Court's award to General Instrument.4 We review an award 
of attorney's fees for abuse of discretion. See Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990). But "the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Nu-Tek apparently does not challenge the decision to award attorney's 
fees. 
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question of what standards to apply in calculating an 
award of attorney's fees is a legal question, and therefore 
we exercise plenary review over this issue." Washington v. 
Philadelphia County Ct. of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 
1034-35 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Here, the District Court adopted General Instrument's 
calculation of attorney's fees using the "lodestar" method: 
hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable 
hourly rate. See General Instrument III, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 
611-12. According to Nu-Tek, adherence to the lodestar 
method rewarded General Instrument for "overlawyering" 
and ignored General Instrument's "limited degree of 
success." As Nu-Tek points out, General Instrument 
originally asserted over $9 billion in damages, including $2 
billion on the S 553 claim, before ultimately winning a 
judgment for only $60,000. Also, General Instrument 
prevailed only on the S 553 claim, but lost or withdrew its 
claims under S 605, the Lanham Act, and federal trademark 
and copyright law. 
 
The lodestar method is "[t]he most useful starting point 
for determining the amount of a reasonable fee." Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Indeed, there is a 
"strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents the 
reasonable fee." City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 
562 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). But courts 
also must consider the degree of success obtained-- an 
element which the Supreme Court has called "the most 
critical factor" in assessing reasonableness of a fee award. 
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (quoting 
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436). In Farrar, the Court vacated an 
attorney's fees award of $280,000 where plaintiff recovered 
only nominal damages despite seeking $17 million in 
compensatory damages. 
 
Nu-Tek contends that because General Instrument 
recovered only a small portion of its originally asserted 
monetary damages, its degree of success was too limited to 
warrant a $412,000 fee award. We disagree. The award of 
damages, although small in comparison to what was 
originally sought, represents the maximum amount the 
District Court believed could be awarded under the Cable 
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Act's statutory damages provision.5 Furthermore, it is 
significant that General Instrument successfully obtained 
permanent injunctive relief against Nu-Tek, achieving the 
crucial goal of putting an end to Nu-Tek's illegal conversion 
of General Instrument's cable boxes. We have recognized 
"[t]he amount of damages awarded, when compared with 
the amount of damages requested, may be one measure of 
how successful [a] plaintiff was in his or her action . . . ." 
Washington, 89 F.3d at 1041. But that comparison may be 
an imperfect measure, especially where injunctive relief is 
also awarded. Because General Instrument obtained a 
permanent injunction barring Nu-Tek from engaging in its 
illegal activities and also received the maximum amount of 
statutory damages, its suit achieved substantial success. 
Therefore, the lodestar was an appropriate standard for 
damages. 
 
Assuming the lodestar method is valid, Nu-Tek also 
claims the amount of fees was unreasonable in several 
other respects. Nu-Tek asserts that General Instrument's 
lead attorney, Geoffrey Beauchamp, recorded 1,171.82 
hours of billing time on the case but excluded only about 
330 hours as unrelated to the S 553 action when adjusting 
the fee petition. Portions of the hours claimed by other 
attorneys and paralegals were excluded in a similar 
manner. Nu-Tek, noting the alleged expertise of General 
Instrument's attorneys, asserts the amount of time spent 
on this allegedly simple case was excessive. Nu-Tek claims 
the District Court should have reduced the fees further to 
reflect this, though Nu-Tek does not explain by precisely 
how much. In addition, Nu-Tek contends the fees should 
have been lowered to reflect the duplicative efforts 
expended by General Instrument's attorneys -- for example, 
deposing one witness four times and spending three trial 
days on an ultimately unsuccessful Lanham Act claim. 
Finally, Nu-Tek claims the District Court "erred by not 
applying a sufficient negative multiplier to General 
Instrument's lodestar figure that accounted fairly for failed 
claims or the imprecise time records attached to General 
Instrument's fee petition." As noted, the court accepted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court's interpretation of the maximum damages provision 
is discussed infra. 
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General Instrument's negative multipliers, which resulted 
in reductions of over $76,000 for work that was clearly 
unrelated to the S 553 claim and an additional reduction of 
over $80,000 for work that was only partially related to the 
winning claim. 
 
We are not convinced by Nu-Tek's arguments. As the 
District Court noted, "General Instrument submitted 
voluminous billing records and supporting affidavits, 
detailing the reasonable hourly rates, the attorneys, dates, 
the subject matter of the work, and the amount of time 
devoted to each matter." General Instrument III, 3 F. Supp. 
2d at 611. The court did not blindly accept General 
Instrument's calculations. In rejecting Nu-Tek's assertion 
that General Instrument's fees were excessive and 
duplicative, the court explained in some detail the parties' 
competing stances, including Nu-Tek's contention that the 
case was a straightforward one, and concluded, "After 
careful review, I find that the multiplier used by GI fairly 
reflects the amount of work devoted to the prevailing S 533 
claim." Id. at 612. On appeal, "[o]ur task is not to determine 
whether, sitting as a court of the first instance, we would 
have reached the same conclusion as the district court did." 
Washington, 89 F.3d at 1039. We see no abuse of discretion 





General Instrument, as cross-appellant, contends the 
District Court erred in interpreting the Cable Act to 
preclude a recovery of statutory civil damages based on 
each illegal cable box sold by Nu-Tek. The District Court 
awarded General Instrument $60,000 in damages, believing 
this was the maximum amount authorized by the Cable 
Act. See General Instrument II, 1997 WL 325804, at *3. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Nu-Tek also contests the District Court's inclusion of costs totaling 
more than $100,000, approximately half of which was paid for 
investigation. Nu-Tek asserts these costs were excessive. As with the 
attorney's fees, General Instrument has submitted careful records of its 
costs. The District Court found those records reasonable and 
appropriate. We see no abuse of discretion. 
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General Instrument contends the Cable Act, as amended by 
Congress in 1992, requires the District Court to award 
between $250 and $10,000 for each converted cable box 
illegally sold by Nu-Tek. Because there were 3,596 such 
devices sold after January 1, 1993 (the effective date of the 
amended damages provision), General Instrument's theory 
would authorize a far greater monetary recovery, ranging 
from approximately $900,000 to over $215 million. 
 
Section 553 allows plaintiffs to choose between actual 
damages or statutory damages. 47 U.S.C.A. S 553(c)(3)(A).7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. S 553. Unauthorized reception of cable service 
 
       (a) Unauthorized interception or receipt or assist ance in 
       intercepting or receiving service; "assist in intercepting or 
       receiving" defined 
 
       (1) No person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting 
or 
       receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, 
       unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable operator or as 
may 
       otherwise be specifically authorized by law. 
 
       (2) For the purpose of this section, the term"assist in 
intercepting 
       or receiving" shall include the manufacture or distribution of 
       equipment intended by the manufacturer or distributor (as the case 
       may be) for unauthorized reception of any communications service 
       offered over a cable system in violation of subparagraph (1). 
 
       (b) Penalties for willful violation 
 
       (1) Any person who willfully violates subsection (a)(1) of this 
       section shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not 
       more than 6 months, or both. 
 
       (2) Any person who violates subsection (a)(1) of this section 
       willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private 
       financial gain shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned 
       for not more than 2 years, or both, for the first such offense and 
       shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned for not more 
       than 5 years, or both, for any subsequent offense. 
 
       (3) For purposes of all penalties and remedies established for 
       violations of subsection (a)(1) of this section, the prohibited 
activity 
       established herein as it applies to each such device shall be 
deemed 
       a separate violation. 
        (c) Civil action in district court; injunctions; damages; 
       attorney's fees and costs; regulation by States or franchising 
       authorities 
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Before trial, General Instrument elected to seek statutory 
damages. The statutory damages provision provides: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (1) Any person aggrieved by any violation of subsection (a)(1) of 
       this section may bring a civil action in a United States district 
court 
       or in any other court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
       (2) The court may-- 
 
       (A) grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may 
       deem reasonable to prevent or restrain violations of subsection 
(a)(1) 
       of this section; 
 
       (B) award damages as described in paragraph (3); and 
 
       (C) direct the recovery of full costs, including awarding 
reasonable 
       attorneys' fees to an aggrieved party who prevails. 
 
       (3)(A) Damages awarded by any court under this section shall be 
       computed in accordance with either of the following clauses: 
 
       (i) the party aggrieved may recover the actual damages suffered by 
       him as a result of the violation and any profits of the violator 
that 
       are attributable to the violation which are not taken into account 
in 
       computing the actual damages; in determining the violator's 
profits, 
       the party aggrieved shall be required to prove only the violator's 
       gross revenue, and the violator shall be required to prove his 
       deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to 
       factors other than the violation; or 
 
       (ii) the party aggrieved may recover an award of statutory 
       damages for all violations involved in the action, in a sum of not 
less 
       than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court considers just. 
 
       (B) In any case in which the court finds that the violation was 
       committed willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or 
       private financial gain, the court in its discretion may increase 
the 
       award of damages, whether actual or statutory under subparagraph 
       (A), by an amount of not more than $50,000. 
 
       (C) In any case where the court finds that the violator was not 
       aware and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted a 
       violation of this section, the court in its discretion may reduce 
the 
       award of damages to a sum of not less than $100. 
 
       (D) Nothing in this subchapter shall prevent any State or 
       franchising authority from enacting or enforcing laws, consistent 
       with this section, regarding the unauthorized interception or 
       reception of any cable service or other communications service. 
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       (ii) the party aggrieved may recover an award of 
       statutory damages for all violations involved in the 
       action, in a sum of not less than $250 or more than 
       $10,000 as the court considers just. 
 
       (B) In any case in which the court finds that the 
       violation was committed wilfully and for purposes of 
       commercial advantage or private financial gain, the 
       court in its discretion may increase the award of 
       damages, whether actual or statutory under 
       subparagraph (A), by an amount of not more than 
       $50,000. 
 
Id. S 553(c)(3)(A)(ii)-3(B). Because the statute establishes an 
award of between $250 and $10,000 "for all violations 
involved in the action," the District Court held that $10,000 
was the maximum amount that could be awarded, 
regardless of how many individual violations took place. See 
General Instrument II, 1997 WL 325804, at *3. The court 
awarded General Instrument $10,000 and, finding the 
testimony of Nu-Tek's CEO to be "an exercise in rank 
perjury," id., imposed the additional $50,000 discretionary 
penalty authorized by S 553(c)(3)(B). 
 
In doing so, the District Court rejected General 
Instrument's argument that a 1992 amendment to S 553(b) 
established that statutory civil damages are to be awarded 
for each violation, rather than "all violations" as specified in 
S 553(c). As amended, S 553(b) provides: 
 
       (b) Penalties for willful violation 
 
       (1) Any person who willfully violates subsection (a)(1) 
       of this section shall be fined not more than $1,000 or 
       imprisoned for not more than 6 months, or both. 
 
       (2) Any person who violates subsection (a)(1) of this 
       section willfully and for purposes of commercial 
       advantage or private financial gain shall be fined not 
       more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than 
       2 years, or both, for the first such offense and shall 
       be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned for 
       not more than 5 years, or both, for any subsequent 
       offense. 
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       (3) For purposes of all penalties and remedies 
       established for violations of subsection (a)(1) of this 
       section, the prohibited activity established herein as 
       it applies to each such device shall be deemed a 
       separate violation. 
 
Reasoning that Congress had purposefully amended this 
"criminal" subsection of S 553 to establish cumulative 
criminal penalties for each violation while leaving 
undisturbed the plain language of S 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) 
establishing statutory civil damages of $250 to $10,000 "for 
all violations involved in the action," the District Court 
concluded the 1992 amendment did not require 
computation of civil damages on a per-violation basis. 
General Instrument II, 1997 WL 325804, at *2. 
 
Another district court in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania has reached the same conclusion. See 
Comcast Cablevision v. Roselli, No. 96-2938, 1997 WL 
36957 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1997). There, the court pointed 
out that 47 U.S.C.A. S 605, relating to wire and radio 
communication theft and publication, provides for an 
award of statutory damages of $1,000 to $10,000 for "each 
violation" of S 605(a). The court held: 
 
       Congress . . . left untouched the "for all violations 
       involved" language in S 553(c)(3)(A)(ii). As a comparison 
       of that provision with S 605(e)(3)(C)(I)(II) makes clear, 
       Congress has no difficulty distinguishing "each" from 
       "all." 
 
       * * * * 
 
       [U]nless and until Congress changes the word "all" in 
       S 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) to "each," it would be inappropriate for 
       a court to multiply a civil damage award under S 553 
       based on the number of violations involved in a single 
       action. 
 
Id. at *2-3. In contrast, district courts elsewhere have held 
that S 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) allows the court to award statutory 
damages for each violation of S 553(a)(1). See, e.g., Mountain 
Cable Co. v. Choquette, 53 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D. Mass. 
1999); Columbia Cable TV Co., Inc. v. McCary, 954 F. Supp. 
124, 128 (D.S.C. 1996); Time Warner Cable of N.Y. v. 
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Freedom Elec., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (S.D. Fla. 
1995). Significantly, in the only other circuit opinion to 
have addressed this question directly, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, adopting the same reasoning and 
language as Roselli, held that statutory damages could not 
be assessed for each individual violation by a manufacturer 
like Nu-Tek but only for "all violations." See Continental 
Cablevision, Inc. v. Poll, 124 F.3d 1044, 1048-1051 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
 
As noted, S 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides "the party aggrieved 
may recover an award of statutory damages for all 
violations involved in the action, in a sum of not less than 
$250 or more than $10,000 as the court considers just." 
The plain language of the statute anticipates multiple 
violations and a single award of damages. 
 
Furthermore, the structure of the statute makes clear 
that S 553(b), "Penalties for wilful violation," addresses 
criminal violations only. The 1992 amendment on which 
Nu-Tek relies was inserted only in S 553(b) and permits 
cumulative criminal sanctions. See Comcast Cablevision, 
1997 WL 36957, at *3 ("Congress intended only to bring 
criminal sanctions for violations of S 553(a)(1) into 
`conformity' with those for violations of S 605(a) and was 
mandating that for each offending device involved in the 
prohibited activity a distinct criminal offense could be 
charged."). General Instrument, however, asserts the words 
"penalties and remedies" in S 553(b) bring both criminal 
and civil actions within the language of the subsection, 
contending the word "remedies" is redundant unless it 
means civil sanctions. The structure of S 553 belies this 
claim. Section 553(a) sets out what is prohibited,S 553(b) 
provides criminal penalties while S 553(c) provides for civil 
redress. Indeed, S 553(c) is titled "Civil action in district 
court . . . ." Applying S 553(b)(3) to a civil case would run 
counter to these clear divisions. Had Congress intended to 
change both subsections (b) and (c) it could have added 
language to both, as in S 605, or possibly to subsection (a). 
Even a single change to S 553(c) would have had more 
"universal" application than a single change to subsection 
(b) as it is S 553(c)(3)(D) which addresses the preemptive 
effect of S 553. Considering the structure ofS 553, we must 
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conclude an amendment to subsection (b) is intended only 
for that subsection.8 
 
Finally, General Instrument contends the District Court's 
interpretation of S 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) would provide companies 
like Nu-Tek a $60,000 "licensing fee" to engage in cable 
theft with impunity. But as noted, plaintiffs are free to elect 
actual, rather than statutory, damages when pursuing 
S 553 claims. See 47 U.S.C.A. S 553(c)(3)(A)(i). In cases 
where the actual damages exceed $60,000 ($10,000 plus 
the discretionary $50,000 augmentation), parties will 
doubtless choose this course. Furthermore, the prospect of 
criminal liability provides an additional deterrent against 
cable theft, particularly since the 1992 amendment 
establishes that each illegal device constitutes a separate 
violation. Id. SS 553(b)(1); 553(b)(3). 
 
We hold that S 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) expressly limits the 
available statutory civil damages to a single award of 
between $250 and $10,000 for all violations.9 Therefore, we 




The District Court did not err in determining that 
General Instrument had constitutional and statutory 
standing to sue Nu-Tek under 47 U.S.C.A. S 553. In our 
view, S 553 expressly provides a federal remedy for cable 
equipment manufacturers such as General Instrument to 
recover for injuries sustained as a direct result of cable 
theft, thus rendering prudential standing concerns 
irrelevant. We also hold the court did not abuse its 
discretion in declining to amend the permanent injunction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. General Instrument also claims the purpose of the 1992 amendment 
was to conform the penalties and remedies of S 553 with S 605. See, e.g., 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 102-862 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1231, 1276. But S 605 demonstrates that Congress knows how to write 
cumulative sanctions. See S 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) (stating "the party 
aggrieved 
may recover an award of statutory damages for each violation of 
subsection (a) of this section . . . and for each violation of paragraph 
(4) 
of this subsection"). 
 
9. Plus the discretionary increase of not more than $50,000. See 
S 553c)(3)(B). 
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or in accepting General Instrument's calculation of 
attorney's fees and costs. Furthermore, we believe the court 
properly interpreted the Cable Act's damages provision. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
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